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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers Hofstede‟s claim that his national cultural “dimension scores” 
and related rankings of countries have predictive power by examining a „validating‟ 
case study he has used in a number of publications to „demonstrate‟ that capability. 
When tested against cross-sectional and longitudinal empirical evidence the case 
study is shown to have neither explanatory nor predictive power. A further unpacking 
of the case study demonstrates methodological flaws in its construction. Some 
characteristics of valid cross-national case studies are then outlined in a discussion of 
these flaws. 
  
Keywords: case studies; femininity; Hofstede; industrial relations; national culture; 
masculinity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
„National culture‟ is a highly contested notion. Its existence; its positing as a values or 
psychological core; the capacity of attitudinal surveys or other methods to measure or 
compare „it‟ cross-nationally; and the appropriateness, adequacy, and accuracy of 
specific representations and rankings of national cultures, or of their differences;  
have all been extensively critiqued (Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier, 2002; 
Kitayama, 2002; McSweeney, 2002; Tung, 2008, for instance). As Michael Hechter 
states: “our capacity to accurately assess these values is unimpressive” (2000: 697). 
But national culturalist assert that their favoured representations of national cultures 
(or national cultural differences) enable effective predictions of social action. Geert 
Hofstede, for instance, boldly claims that he has identified: “five main dimensions 
along which the dominant value systems in more than 50 countries can be ordered and 
that [they] affect human thinking, feeling, and acting, as well as organizations and 
institutions, in predictable ways” (Hofstede, 2001: xix)(emphasis added)(see also 
Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 31).  Has Hofstede
1
 provided “a system of 
generalisations that can be used to make correct predictions” (Friedman, 1953: 4)? If 
he has done so, his national cultural dimension indices, whether deemed accurate 
representations or not, would clearly be useful.  
 
An evaluation of the predictive power of Hofstede‟s indices of national cultural 
differences is undertaken in this paper by testing Hofstede‟s claim that the 
“masculinity-femininity dimension affects ways of handling industrial conflicts” 
(Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 143)(see also Hofstede, 1991: 92; Hofstede, 2001: 
316). Hofstede defines „masculinity‟ versus „femininity‟ as: “[A]ssertiveness and 
competitiveness versus modesty and caring” (Hofstede and Peterson, 2000: 401)(see 
also Hofstede, 2001: 297; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 116).  In the workplace in 
„masculine‟ countries, he states, there is an emphasis on assertiveness, and in 
„feminine‟ countries there is a preference for compromise and negotiations. His claim 
is first tested in this paper against a decade of data on “industrial conflict” (Hofstede 
and Hofstede, 2005: 143).  It is then cross-sectionally and longitudinally tested against 
another indicator of the level of aggression within countries: homicide rates.  
 
 
A VALIDATING CASE STUDY 
 
Hofstede, in common with many employers of the notion of national culture, seeks, in 
part, to validate, his claim about the causal impact of the level of “masculinity-
femininity” of a country with a number of case studies. The term „case study‟ is used 
in many different ways (Ragin, 1992). In this paper it is used in the sense of a 
theoretically induced claim about how general social forces produce results in specific 
settings. 
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His seminal works (1980, 2001) are peppered with such cases. One he has reproduced 
in a number of his publications is as follows: 
 
The masculinity-femininity dimension [of a national culture] affects ways of 
handling industrial conflicts. In the United States as well as in other 
masculine cultures (such as Britain and Ireland), there is a feeling that 
conflicts should be resolved by a good fight: "let the best man win." The 
industrial relations scene in these countries is marked by such fights. If 
possible, management tries to avoid having to deal with labor unions at all, 
and labor union behaviour justifies their aversion. In feminine cultures like 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, there is a preference for resolving 
conflicts through compromise and negotiations (Hofstede and Hofstede, 
2005: 143) (see also Hofstede, 1991:92; 2001:316). 
 
The case study asserts causal regularity: “[t]he masculinity-femininity dimension [of a 
national culture] affects ways of handling industrial conflicts.” A causal claim (Y 
because of X) can be distinguished from a weaker notion of association or correlation: 
when X then Y. Association, as an immense classical and contemporary literature 
convincingly demonstrates, is not sufficient evidence of causality. But without 
association as a regular sequence causality cannot be validly said to exist nor can 
predictability be demonstrated. Regular association is thus a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of valid causal claims or effective predictions.
2
 But as we shall 
see, there is not even a weak association between the supposed independent 
variable/cause (national gender as measured by Hofstede) and dependent 
variable/outcome (industrial conflict). The asserted associations/predictions, and thus 
the causal claim, in the case study are shown to consistently fail.  
 
Following those tests, methodological flaws in the construction of Hofstede‟s case 
study are indentified and examined, including: non-equivalence between the 
compared sets of countries; incompatibility with readily available data; assertion, not 
demonstration, of causality; and inconsistency within the causal claim. Drawing on 
those failings, some guidelines for more appropriate and valid cross-national 
comparative case studies are set-out. 
 
PREDICTIVE POWER? 
 
At what level should the predictive power of Hofstede‟s dimensions be tested? Many 
cross-cultural courses, training programmes, and multiple publications wrongly 
suppose that national averages (Hofstede‟s or others‟) also describe and can predict 
practice at levels „lower‟ than the national – the organizational, the local, the 
individual, and so forth – where most practices occur. But making direct translations 
of properties or relations at one level to another, by projecting from a higher level to a 
lower (from the national to organizational or individual) – is unwarranted even it we 
suppose that the depiction of the national level is accurate. Robinson (1950) originally 
described the attribution of views about the characteristics of one level to other levels 
also as the “ecological fallacy” (1950) and Galtung calls it “the fallacy of the wrong 
level” (1967)(see also Hofstede, 2001: 16, 463). Relationships identified at one level 
of analysis may be stronger or weaker at a different level of analysis, or may even 
reverse direction (Klein and Kozlowski 2000). Disaggregation leads to 
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misrepresentation whenever populations are not wholly homogeneous. But error may 
also occur when a property at one level are attributed to a homogeneous group at a 
lower level. Schwartz (1994a), citing, Zito (1975), gives the illustrative example of 
the discrepancy between a hung jury at two levels. As a group, a hung jury is an 
indecisive jury, unable to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused. However, 
attributing that characteristic to the individual members of the jury would be incorrect 
as the jury is hung because its individual members are very decisive – not indecisive.  
Hofstede states that the four dimensions he employed (masculinity-femininity, and so 
forth) “together account for 49% percent of the variance in country mean scores” of 
answers to an IBM employee survey – his primary data source (Hofstede, Neuijen, 
Ohayv, and Sanders, 1990: 288)(emphasis added). Even if we accept the accuracy of 
his calculations 51% of national variance in mean scores of respondents‟ answers is 
unexplained.  And of itself the 51% explains nothing about national behaviour. The 
analysis was of questionnaire answers – not of behaviour, actions, or practices.  But 
even more significantly, in terms of level of analysis, the pattern of correlation found 
in national averages is not replicated at the individual level. Gerhart and Fang (2005: 
977) estimate, based on Hofstede‟s data, that only “somewhere between 2 and 4 
percent” of the variance at the level of individuals answers is explained by national 
differences – a tiny portion. Hofstede‟s own estimate of 4.2 per cent is only 
marginally higher (2001: 50).  Furthermore, two of the four (later five) dimensions 
employed by Hofstede to depict national cultures – “power distance” and 
“individualism and collectivism” were statistically identified by him only in nationally 
averaged data. At the level of individuals they had near-zero intercorrelations (Bond 
2002; Schwartz 1994b) for those dimensions and thus no explanatory power at that 
level. The massive gap between the ability of national-level data to describe or predict 
micro-level behaviour (above) is also consistent with the personality psychology 
literature which has long found that hypothesized global trait dispositions like 
friendliness, power-distance and dominance typically account for no more that 9 to 15 
per cent of diversity of individual differences over naturally occurring situations 
(Shweder 1979). 
 
In this paper we test the predictive power of some of Hofstede‟s national cultural 
depictions at the level they should be most powerful: the macro-comparative (Bollen, 
Entwisle and Alderson, 1993) or national aggregate level. National level data 
smoothes-out local variations. More powerful, and more useful predictions, would be 
about subnational sites of action, for example, about actions within regions, sectors, or 
individual organizations. If reasonably accurate predictions could be made about 
conditions or behaviours at such sub-national levels that would indicate considerable 
national uniformity of practices and an immense predictive ability of Hofstede‟s 
indices. However, in this paper the less demanding requirement – national level 
predictions only - is tested. A strong test and a weaker test of predictive power at that 
level are applied.  
 
Strong test - comparative ranking: This test considers whether there is an association 
between a country‟s ranking in Hofstede‟s Masculinity Index (hereafter MAS Index) 
and the comparative level of industrial conflicts. The higher a country‟s ranking (that 
is, the more „masculine‟ it is rated on Hofstede‟s MAS index) the greater should be 
the industrial conflict in that country. And conversely, the lower in the Index a 
country, the more „feminine‟ it is deemed to be and the less intense should be such 
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conflict. Thus, of the six countries named in Hofstede‟s case study, Ireland (ranked 
joint 9
th
-10
th 
in the MAS index) would have comparatively more disputes than Great 
Britain (ranked joint 12
th
 with two other countries) which would have more disputes 
than the United States (ranked 19
th
). Similarly, the lower a country is rated in the 
MAS Index (that is, the more “feminine” a country) the fewer disputes it should have. 
Thus Sweden (ranked 74
th
) would have comparatively fewer disputes than the 
Netherlands (ranked 72
nd
), which would have fewer disputes than Denmark (ranked 
71
st
).  
 
The considerable variation over time in the levels of industrial disputes in countries 
might seem to readily falsify this deterministic notion of national culture, but of itself 
it does not.  What is claimed/tested are not absolute levels of disputes but rankings: 
cross-national comparisons.  
 
Weaker test - non-ranked dichotomy: This test considers whether there is a general 
association between a country depiction in the MAS Index as a „masculine‟ or a 
„feminine‟ country and the level of industrial conflict.   A positive result would be 
that, whilst not necessarily in rank order, “masculine” countries would have more 
aggressive industrial relations than „feminine‟ countries. So, for example, in the case 
of the six countries named by Hofstede, the requirement is merely that the three 
countries with the highest level of disputes are “masculine” and the three with the 
lowest level of industrial disputes are “feminine”. It would not matter therefore, for 
instance, if Ireland, with the highest comparative „masculinity ranking‟, had a lower 
level of disputes than one or both of the other two „masculine‟ countries provided 
there were more disputes in Ireland than in the three „feminine‟ countries.3  
 
 
DATA 
 
What data is appropriate for identifying the degree of conflict in industrial relations? 
Industrial relations are complex. But strikes and lockouts are widely regarded as a 
good measure of the level of industrial conflict in a country (provided there are not 
significant coercive restrictions on the right to strike)(Chernyshev, Egger, Mehran and 
Ritter, 2002). However, absolute measures are of little use for international 
comparisons because of the great differences in sizes of countries. There is a wide 
consensus, that the best available comparative indicator of levels of conflict in 
industrial relations is working days not worked due to labour disputes per thousand 
employees (Edwards, 1995).   
 
Tables 1 and 2 (below) shows data of days lost due to labour disputes per 1,000 
employees over a ten year period (1993 to 2005, inclusive). The data is divided into 
two five year periods (1996-2000, inclusive) and (2001-2005, inclusive) in all 
industries and services for the three „masculine‟ countries and three „feminine 
countries named in Hofstede‟s case study, namely: „masculine‟ Ireland, Britain, and 
the United States and „feminine‟ Sweden, Netherlands, and Denmark. 
  
The stronger, the comparative ranking, test is first discussed.  
 
The first column on the left in Table 1 names the countries (from top to bottom of the 
table) in the ranking order predicted on the basis of the MAS Index. The most 
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masculine country in the Index, Ireland, is first, and so on down to the most feminine 
of the six countries, namely, Sweden. The two columns to the right show the actual 
rankings based on working days not worked due to labour disputes per 1,000 
employees in all industries and sectors. As the most „masculine‟ of the six countries, 
Ireland should have the highest level of disputes. But instead the country with the 
highest level of disputes in both of the periods is „feminine‟ Denmark.4 Great Britain 
predicted to be the second most aggressive country was in fourth place in each of the 
periods.  Netherlands predicted to be more aggressive than Sweden on the basis of the 
MAS Index, had comparatively fewer disputes than in Sweden in all three periods. 
Sweden the most „feminine‟ of the six countries – indeed the most „feminine‟ of all 
countries in Hofstede‟s MAS index had the second highest level of disputes in 2001-
2005.  Of the twelve rankings in Table 1 only one is predicted correctly, that of the 
United States in 1996-2000.  In neither of the two periods does the actual ranking of 
the six countries named by Hofstede match the ranking predicted on the basis of his 
MAS index.  A considerable failure of prediction. An analysis of data for each 
individual year within 1996-2005 (inclusive) also shows that in none of the years does 
Hofstede‟s ranking match the actual six-country ranking ([UK] Office of National 
Statistics, 2007; 2002).  
 
Clearly the MAS Index fails the stronger test. But what of the weaker non-ranked 
dichotomy test? Does the mere classification of a country as „masculine‟ or „feminine‟ 
in the MAS Index have any predictive power? Ignoring ranking within masculine or 
feminine countries, is there more industrial conflict in „masculine‟ countries than in 
„feminine‟ countries?  
In neither of the two periods are the three countries with the highest levels of 
industrial disputes all „masculine‟ and in none of those periods are all of the countries 
with the lowest levels of industrial disputes „feminine‟ (Table 1; Figure 1). A decisive 
failure. In the ten individual years (1996 onwards to 2005) in only one (1996) were 
the top three countries „masculine‟ and the bottom three „feminine‟ (albeit with a 
different ranking than predicted by Hofstede)(Office of National Statistics, 2007; 
2002). So, in twelve out of thirteen years, Hofstede‟s case study even fails the weaker 
category test. A decisive failure. 
 
Unrepresentative countries. The claim in Hofstede‟s case study is not merely that a 
causal relationship between national gender and industrial conflict exists in the six 
named countries, but in all countries. As we have seen - for the six named countries 
the causal claim is at odds with the actual record of industrial disputes. But even had 
the data for the six countries been in accord with Hofstede‟s causal claim that would 
not have been sufficient supportive evidence of an association between „masculinity‟ 
and higher levels of industrial disputes. A necessary condition of valid comparison is 
that the comparators are equivalents. But the comparison in Hofstede‟s case study is 
not equivalent: „feminine‟ countries are not compared with countries with equivalent 
levels of „masculinity‟. The named „feminine‟ countries are at the extreme feminine 
end of the MAS Index: Sweden (most); Netherlands (3
rd
 most); and Denmark (4
th
 
most). But these are not compared with any of the top four most 'masculine' countries 
in the Index. Indeed, only one of the masculine countries (Ireland) is in his list of the 
top ten most masculine countries. It‟s ranked joint 9th, whilst Great Britain and the 
United States are joint 12th and 19th respectively (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 120-
121).  
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To correct for that defect Table 3 (below) includes ten additional countries – five 
„masculine‟ and five „feminine‟. They were selected in accordance with the following 
criterion: the most „masculine‟ and the most „feminine‟ countries (if not already in 
Hofstede‟s six named countries) for which reliable and comparable labour dispute 
data for the time periods under review was available. Unavailability of data excluded 
Slovakia which is the most „masculine‟ country in the MAS Index. Instead, Japan 
ranked second highest for „masculinity‟ in the MAS Index, and for which comparable 
data is obtainable, is included as is Norway ranked the second most „feminine‟ 
country in Hofstede‟s index. Also excluded is Hungary5 (third highest in Hofstede‟s 
MAS index) as no data is available for the period 1996-2000. So, given the 
availability of data criterion, Tables 3 and 4 compare eight equivalent „masculine‟ and 
eight „feminine‟ countries.  
 
Again, Hofstede‟s predictions fail both the comparative ranking and the non-ranked 
dichotomy test. It is clear to the naked-eye that there is no association. Japan the most 
masculine country on the basis of the MAS  index had the lowest number of disputes 
jointly with „masculine‟ Austria and „masculine‟ Luxembourg in 1996-2000; and the 
lowest jointly with Luxembourg in 1996-2000. In the ten-year period (1996-2005) no 
country had fewer disputes than Japan but the MAS Index based prediction is that it 
would have the highest. „Feminine‟ Denmark predicted to be the 13th lowest had the 
highest level of disputes in 1996-2000 followed by „feminine‟ Spain with the second 
highest level. In 2001-2005 „feminine‟ Spain (predicted to be 10th lowest out of 
sixteen) had the highest level of disputes. Out of the 32 rankings in Table 3, based on 
actual levels of disputes, only 2 matched ranking predicted on the basis of the MAS 
index. In both periods five out of the eight highest countries for industrial disputes 
were „feminine‟ (see Figure 2, below).  The MAS index predicted outcome is that all 
eight would be „masculine‟. Another failure of prediction. 
 
 
POWER-DISTANCE 
 
Hofstede also states that a country‟s position in his Power-Distance Index (hereafter 
P-D Index)
6
 is a good predictor of the levels of violence in that country (2001: 111). 
“Smaller power distances”, he says, are associated with a certain consensus amongst 
the population that reduces disruptive conflicts” (2001: 111).  Referring specifically to 
industrial relations he states that the P-D index “informs us about the dependence 
relationships in a country. In small-power-distance countries, there is limited 
dependence of subordinates on bosses, and therefore a preference for consultation” 
(Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 45). On this basis, the lower a country is in the P-D 
Index the comparatively more consensus (fewer disputes) is predicted for it. Table 5 
(below) compares Hofstede‟s predicted power-distance ranking of the same sixteen 
countries as in Tables 3 and 4 with actual ranking using the same industrial dispute 
data. 
 
We can observe directly from Table 5 (below) that there is no association. For 
example, Denmark predicted on the basis of Hofstede‟s P-D Index to have the second 
lowest record out of the sixteen countries, had the highest level of industrial disputes 
in 1996-2000 and the fifth highest in 2001-2005. Japan predicted to have the fourth 
highest level of disputes had the joint lowest in both periods. Austria predicted to 
have the lowest level of disputes did so jointly with two other countries in 1996-2000, 
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but it had the fourth highest in 2001-2005.  Luxembourg predicted to be the sixth 
highest had jointly the lowest record in both periods. Out of 32 rankings based on 
actuals (Table 5) only 5 matched the predicted outcomes, yet another clear failure.  
The P-D Index has no predictive power in relation to “consensus” or aggression in 
terms of ranking of countries as measured by comparative levels of industrial 
disputes. 
 
The P-D Index also fails the weaker non-ranked dichotomy test. In 1996-2000 eight of 
the sixteen countries and in 2001-2005 ten of the sixteen countries are miscategorised. 
For instance, in 2001-2005, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Denmark and Austria 
predicted to be in the upper half in terms of higher levels of industrial disputes were in 
the lower half. 
 
 Correlations: Contrary to the claim in Hofstede‟s case study the lack of predictive 
power of his MAS index in relation to industrial disputes is so great that it is clear to 
the naked-eye (Tables 1,2, 3, and 4, below) without the employment of more 
„sophisticated‟ statistical analysis. Similarity, the explanatory and predictive 
ineffectiveness of his P-D Index in relation to industrial disputes is clearly revealed 
(Table 5, below). However, correlation tests were carried out on annual industrial 
dispute data for whole country data and on data sets for the production/construction 
sector, and that for the services sector.
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 The data analysis revealed that there are no 
consistent statistically significant correlations between national industrial dispute data 
with the MAS Index or the P-D Index. 
 
 Interaction Term: Although Hofstede‟s case study (above) refers only to one 
dimension (masculinity-femininity) theoretically it is possible within Hofstede‟s 
model that strike rates could also simultaneously be affected by power-distance. To 
consider this an interaction term was created for the whole country sample. But no 
consistent significant correlations between this interaction term and successive 
industrial dispute rates were discovered.  
 
 
ANOTHER INDICATOR OF AGGRESSION 
 
The actual data on industrial disputes comprehensively refutes the causal claim in 
Hofstede‟s case study above. As an additional test of Hofstede‟s claim, that the 
comparative position of a country in terms of his measures of masculinity-femininity 
and/or power-distance indicates the comparative level of conflict in that country, these 
dimensions are looked at below in relation to another indicator of levels of conflict in 
a country: national rates of homicide. The proportions of a population who die in this 
manner differ dramatically between countries. Do Hofstede‟s country rankings have 
predictive power in relation to homicide rates? 
 
Table 6 (below) lists twenty-six countries ranked in order of annual average rates of 
homicides (excluding deaths due to capital punishment and operations of war) over a 
seven-year period 1990-1996 (inclusive). That ranking is compared with those 
predicted on the basis of the MAS and P-D indices. Countries included in the table are 
the twelve most „masculine‟ and the twelve most „feminine‟ countries in the MAS 
Index for which comparable homicide data is available together with any country 
named in Hofstede‟s industrial relations validating case study (above) not included in 
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that list of twenty four.  The only country thus initially excluded was the „masculine‟ 
United States. It was included and matched with the nearest equivalent „feminine‟ 
country for which comparable data was available, namely Spain. The United States is 
ranked as the nineteenth most masculine country in the MAS index, Spain is ranked 
as the twenty-third most „feminine‟ country in the MAS with the score given to it by 
Hofstede close to that of the nineteenth most „feminine‟ country in the MAS index: 
Croatia for which comparable homicide data was not available. In total there are 
thirteen matched „masculine‟ and thirteen „feminine‟ countries listed in Table 6 
(below). The table is symmetrical in the sense that it contains the same number of 
equivalently ranked „masculine‟ and „feminine‟ countries. 
 
The comparison shows considerable divergence between that the actual rankings for 
homicide and the rankings predicted using of either the MAS Index or the P-D Index. 
The country with the highest homicide rate - Columbia – is „masculine‟. But, its 
predicted ranking using either of the indices is much lower - twelfth out of twenty-six 
countries on the basis of the „masculinity‟ index and seventh on the basis of the 
power-distance index. The next two countries with the highest homicide rates (Russia 
and Estonia) are „feminine. Russia‟s predicted P-D ranking is correct at second 
highest but its ranking on the basis of the MAS index is out by fourteen places.  Japan 
which has the lowest homicide rate is predicted by its „masculinity‟ ranking to be the 
country with the highest level of homicides and to be twelfth highest on the basis of 
its power-distance ranking. The top half of the table includes six „female‟ countries 
out of thirteen. The bottom half of the table has six „masculine‟ countries.  The three 
countries with the lowest homicide rates, viz. Great Britain, Ireland and Japan, are 
„masculine‟ – the exact opposite of the predictions based on the MAS Index. 
 
The MAS Index also fails the weaker non-ranked dichotomy test. Instead of all 
masculine countries being in the most aggressive half (as measured by homicide rates) 
and feminine countries in the less aggressive half the actual results show mixed 
categories (Table 6; Figure 3). In the seven-year period covered in Table 6 almost half 
(six out of the thirteen) of the countries with the highest homicide rates were 
feminine.  
 
Similarly, ranking in the P-D Index has no predictive power. Five of the countries in 
the top half of Table 6 were predicted on a power-distance basis to be in the bottom 
half of the table. Even for the remaining eight countries in the top half, overall there is 
no systematic relationship between their power-distance ranking and their rates of 
homicide. For instance, Slovakia which is predicted to have the highest homicide rate 
on the basis of both of Hofstede‟s indices is only the eleventh highest whilst 
Columbia predicted to be seventh has the highest homicide rate. Of the fifty-two 
predicted rankings (Table 6), only three match the actual rankings. Another 
unambiguous failure. 
 
The failure of Hofstede‟s MAS index and his P-D index to be able to predict the 
homicide ranking of countries or even to be able to predict what is the „gender‟ of 
countries with higher homicide rates and those with lower is, as was shown 
previously, evident from Table 6 and Figure 3.  But correlation between these indices 
and homicide data were also calculated separately using both multi-year period data 
and single year data. The results were the same. 
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Notably, our results fail to signify any significant differences (in means and medians) 
between the male and female countries and between the low and high P-D ranked 
countries. If the MAS and P-D indices were meaningful and informative, we would 
expect that the groups (those higher or lower in the indices) would differ significantly 
in the rates of homicide documented for at least some of the examined periods of 
time. They do not. 
 
Failure: The predictive power of two of Hofstede‟s national cultural rankings 
(masculinity-femininity and power-distance) was tested against data on actual events 
relating to industrial disputes and to homicides in multiple countries. In contrast with 
Hofstede‟s claims about the predictive capability of his national cultural rankings, 
none was found. There are no significant associations; positive correlation; no 
predictive power; and therefore no evidence of causality or otherwise useful 
information.  These findings are consistent with geographer Philip Wagner wider 
view that: “Aggregating mightily, one can speak of national cultures. The chief 
attribute of such a broad concept is its uselessness (1975:11).  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
As we have seen the flaws in Hofstede‟s industrial relations case study cannot be 
attributed to a data collection or analysis error – it suffers from much more severe 
methodological problems. The gap between actual data and the predicted outcome is 
so enormous that we can reasonably describe the case study as a projective fiction.
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Case studies play significant research and pedagogic roles not only in the 
management and business disciplines but also in the wider social sciences and the 
natural sciences (David, 2005). However, although case study research is widely 
undertaken, its ability to generate valid knowledge is often questioned. The central 
criticism is that case studies cannot spawn explanations or theory which is 
generalizable (Campbell and Stanley, 1981; King, Keohane and Sidney, 1994), that is, 
their findings cannot be shown to be universally valid.  And yet, “much of what we 
know about the empirical world is drawn from such studies” (Gerring, 2004: 341). 
And arguably, such research is often at the forefront of theoretical development 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Ragin, 1992). The dismissal or downgrading of case 
study research because of its inability to generate generalizations has been widely 
rejected as an inappropriate, unnecessary, or unattainable criterion (see Geertz, 1970; 
Hamel, 1992; Kennedy, 1976; Mink, 1968; Murphy, 2003, for example).  Case studies 
can achieve things which other research approaches cannot do, or do as well. But 
there are matters on which case studies have lesser, little, or no contribution to make. 
Just as there is no reason for large-scale variable analysts to apologise for the 
limitations of their methods so too the inability to generalize, in the sense of making 
universal statements, from a case study should not blind us to the contributions such 
studies can make.  In any event, although general theory (“covering laws”, in Carl 
Hempel‟s term) is sometimes seen as the ultimate standard for research, even theories 
deemed to have such a quality are usually insufficiently specific to guide policy or 
enable effective interventions at the organizational level.  Generalizations often fade 
when we look at particular situations.  
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What lessons for cross-national case study research and writing can we learn from an 
analysis of Hofstede‟s industrial conflict case study? How in making cross-national 
comparisons can we avoid invalid inferences of the type made by Hofstede?  
 
1.  Ensure comparator equivalence: A cross national case study is by its nature not a 
study of a single setting but of multiple settings – a minimum of two – and is 
therefore comparative. Validity requires that the cross-level comparators are 
equivalent - or to put it another way - that there is sampling frame comparability. As 
discussed above, in Hofstede‟s case study the three named feminine countries are 
compared with three masculine countries all of whom did not have an equivalent 
degree of masculinity in the MAS Index. In comparisons, including cross-national 
comparisons, sample composition is arguably more significant issue than sample size 
(Bollen, Entwisle and Alderson, 1993). Construct and measurement equivalence are 
also vital for valid cross national case studies (Mullen, 1995; Thomas, Hult, Ketchen 
Jr., Griffith, Finnegan, Gonzalez-Padron, Marmancioglu, Huang, Talay, and Cavusgil, 
2008;) but these issues are not directly pertinent to Hofstede‟s case study. 
2. Beware of confirmatory bias: If the record of industrial relations was/is consistent 
with Hofstede‟s law-like generalisation, naming the six countries as illustrative 
examples would be perfectly appropriate as a means of communication. But they are 
named as supportive  evidence. And yet as we have seen above the causal claim in 
Hofstede‟s case study is readily disconfirmed by actual data. Even in the countries 
named as examples in Hofstede‟s case study the record of industrial disputes (and 
homicide) is not consistent with Hofstede‟s assertion. There is thus evidence of 
confirmatory bias (positive test strategy)(Sloman, 2005; Klayman and Ha, 1987) – a 
disproportionate imposition of the researchers‟ prior beliefs. As King,  Keohane, and 
Sidney (1994; 21) observe: “Any intelligent scholar can come up with a plausible 
theory for any set of data after the fact, yet to do so demonstrates nothing about the 
veracity of the theory.” 
 
Cross national researchers may be more familiar with one of the compared countries 
than with others. This may strengthen the presumption of a relationship between two 
factors and thus predisposes one to find and overweight evidence of that relationship 
and decrease the chances of finding disconfirming evidence and if found to discount it 
(Chapman and Chapman,  1969; Goldberg, 1968; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). For 
instance, studies suggest that many physicians are not good at revising their initial 
diagnosis to take account of later diagnostic tests (Berwick, Fineberg, and Weinstein, 
1981); jurors often decide their verdict early in a trial process (Devine and Ostrom, 
1985). We academics as people are not immune from these biases. In the aggregate, 
the evidence seems compelling that the human tendency is to look for evidence that is 
supportive of hypothesis we favour. It is, of course, not possible to examine a 
situation uninfluenced by categories, theories, hunches, and so on. Cases are made by 
invoking theory, implicitly or explicitly.  But the results of case study research need 
not be overly predetermined by the prejudice we project onto the study of the case 
situation. We can and should test the results of our inevitable biases rather than 
allowing them to determine - unquestioned - our „findings‟.  A research focus is not 
the same as a fixation on predetermined research findings. 
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Not all cross-national comparisons can be, or need be, empirically tested. Cross-
national comparisons can serve a variety of useful purposes including: descriptions of 
differences or similarities; hypotheses or puzzle generation; challenging 
ethnocentrism; stimulate further studies; provision of new data; identification of the 
locational limits of existing theory. Academic research is not the only pathway to 
understanding. A good novel, a good play, even a good joke can help us understand, 
but they rest on different standards of evidence.  Reader engagement and plausibility 
are desirable attributes of academic research, but they are poor guides to the validity 
of causal explanations. Research which makes causal claims about the empirical 
world requires more than a subjective sense of conviction. Empirical claims should 
have been empirically tested.  
 
3. Test against readily available information: Every time a „magic word‟ is muttered 
before table salt is immersed in warm water, the table salt will dissolve. But, of 
course, the salt will also dissolve without the „magic word‟. The lesson is that 
correlation, or more mundanely the observance of coincidence in the same time or 
space does not validly show causality. In constructing a case study a writer should 
consider whether there are broadly similar circumstances in which the provisional 
belief about causality does not, or does, hold. Have similar circumstances had 
different and/or similar outcomes than in the case situation under investigation? Do 
similar outcomes to that of the case have different and/or similar circumstances?   
 
We do not have to fully accept Karl Popper‟s theory of falsification to be able to 
accept that data apparently inconsistent with a causal theory is a powerful challenge. 
Such data is not necessarily a decisive “refutation” (1979) requiring the abandonment 
of the theory, but it does demand a response and a modification or contingent 
justification of the initial explanation (Quine, 1953). Reassessment rather than 
rejection might be appropriate. If, however, a causal claim is posed in deterministic 
terms: a given set of conditions inevitably led to a specific outcome – a negative 
finding, provided one is confident in the accuracy of the data - is fatal to the causal 
claim (Dion, 1998).  
 
The claims in Hofstede‟s industrial relations case study are contradicted by readily 
available data. The data on industrial disputes (used in the tables above) is available 
without difficulty from a number of sources including: the International Labour 
Office; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and various 
offices of national statistics. But without even accessing that data, Hofstede‟s causal 
claim is plainly contradicted by the well-known record of very low levels of industrial 
disputes in Japan and Germany. Throughout the post-2
nd
 World War the industrial 
relations in those two countries has been the exemplar of co-operation (Thelen, 1991). 
And yet, in Hofstede's 'masculinity' index, Japan is the second most masculine 
country and Germany the twelfth.  
 
4. Test historically: Consistency of the degree of force is not a necessary 
characteristic of a causal force. But Hofstede‟s, and many others‟, notion of national 
culture is of a constant force: “[w]hile change sweeps the surface, the deeper layers 
remain stable, and the [national] culture rises from its ashes like the phoenix” 
(Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 36). “[N]ational values” are “given facts, as hard as 
country‟s geographic position or its weather” (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 13). The 
masculine-feminine differences he has set out in his index of countries “are”, he 
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states, “unlikely to disappear in the future” (1998: 4) - they are “a basic and enduring 
anthropological fact about a national society” (1998: 10) – “there is no sign of 
convergence of country cultures in the direction of more masculinity, nor in the 
direction of more femininity” (1998: 27).  
 
For Hofstede his dimension measurements are “permanent causes” (Mills, 1843). But 
the record of industrial disputes (and much more besides) shows considerable 
variation over time. In 1996 the three „masculine‟ countries named in Hofstede‟s case 
study had comparatively more industrial disputes than the three „feminine‟ countries, 
albeit not in the rank order predicted on the basis of the MAS or P-D indices. By 
supposing cultural constancy (and, if also acknowledged, that of other cultural and 
non-cultural influences) a generalisation can be made from data from just one-point-
in-time. But in the decade examined in this paper, 1996 was the exception, in none of 
the other nine years did this dichotomised pattern occur.  Absolute levels and 
comparative rankings change as does the record within countries and in a direction 
unrelated to „gender‟. For instance, between 1996-2000 and 2001-2005 there was an 
89% drop in disputes in „feminine‟ Denmark and yet a 500% increase in „feminine‟ 
Netherlands.  In „masculine‟ Ireland there was a reduction of 73% but a rise of 233% 
in „masculine‟ Germany.   
 
The absence of stability over time in the measurements employed (whether national 
averages or not) indicates a key defect of one-point-in-time measurements which 
characterise the great bulk of cross-„cultural‟ studies (Oyserman, Coon and 
Kemmelmeir, 2002; Schetuch, 1967;).  The considerable variation also indicates that 
even if it is supposed that national culture exists and has an influence it is clearly not 
the only, or the dominant, influence. 
  
For practical and institutional reasons, historical studies in organizations are often 
difficult (March and Sutton, 1997) but these constraints scarcely apply to macro-
comparative studies for which data is often readily available. 
 
5.  Avoid excessive conflation: Research designs almost invariably face a choice 
between knowing more about less and knowing less about more (Gerring, 2004).  
Hofstede‟s case study has few, if any, of the strengths of either a good variable-
orientated approach or a good case study orientated approach - and has many of their 
weaknesses. Variable-orientated investigations are usually conservative by design, 
rarely assigning cause unambiguously to one variable. But Hofstede‟s case study 
considers only one independent variable/cause and attributes deterministic power to it. 
Good variable orientated studies emphasise probabilistic outcomes and consideration 
of alternative explanations as rejection of possible explanations plays an essential role 
in choosing the preferred explanation. In contrast, Hofstede‟s case study is absolute 
and no alternatives are considered. And on the other hand, the depth of 
data/familiarity with the diversity and richness of specific circumstances, with the 
process and dynamics of cause and effect, possible only through a case study 
approach is also absent. 
 
Societal level models of all types, not just the cultural, often lack clarity about 
causality (Oyserman and Uskul, 2008). A „cause‟ is described (well or badly) as is the 
outcome(s).  But the causal process, the linkages between cause and outcome is too 
often not unfolded for the reader at least. Instead of descriptions of situated causal 
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mechanisms the mere fact that two conditions exit in the same case study time and 
space together with a general causal theory is treated as sufficient evidence that one 
caused the other.  Hofstede‟s case study reduces immense multi-layered complexity 
within countries to a single level, mechanical, and „anorexic‟ process. It‟s like what 
Chomsky, in another context, called “reducing physics to meter reading” (1968). 
Another way of depicting this issue is to be wary of conceptual over-stretch. There is 
an inverse relationship between the compoundness of a concept and the number of 
cases attributable to, or covered by, it (Mahoney, 2004; Sartori, 1970;).  Sub-national 
analysis will often demonstrate the information poverty of national averages and 
reveal considerable within country heterogeneity (Smith, McSweeney and Fitzgerald, 
2008).  
 
To take the example of industrial relations – the object of explanation/prediction in 
Hofstede‟s case study. There is an immense and scholarly literature on industrial 
relations – including extensive discussions of the multiple influences on industrial 
disputes. The within country variations in the occurrences of industrial disputes are 
consistent with the effects of multiple, changing, and interacting influences. In Ireland, 
for instance, in 2006 days lost due to industrial disputes in the construction sector 
accounted for 65% of total days lost. But in 1997 only 0.04% of days lost were in that 
sector. In 1997 financial and other business sectors accounted for 32% of days lost but in 
1999, 2000, and 2001 no days were lost in those sectors because of disputes. National 
level data obscures considerable within-country variation. This was illustrated above in 
relation to industrial disputes. It can also be seen in relation to homicide. Homicide rates 
vary not only between countries and over time, but also within them. They vary 
immensely across different locations, socio-economic, gender, and ethnic groups (Gaines 
and Kappeler, 1997).  Within the U.S. for example, in 2003 the annual homicide rate per 
100,000 of the population in 2003 in the states of Louisiana and Maryland was 13.0 and 
9.5 but at the other end the rates were 1.2 and 1.3 in Maine and South Dakota 
respectively. In the period 1999-2001 the average homicides per 100,000 of a population 
was more than five times greater in Washington D. C. than in San Francisco. Nisbett and 
Cohen (1996) found that among white men, homicide in response to insults occurs at 
rates several times higher in the southern U. S. states than in the northern states (Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2005; Fiske, 2002;). Sub-state analysis of homicide (and multiple other 
practices) would demonstrate further spatial heterogeneity at sub-county or sub-city and 
so forth (see Law, Serre, Christakos, Leone, and Miller, 2004, for instance). 
 
Explanations of changing levels of industrial disputes, homicides, or whatever require 
not merely multivariate approaches but multivariate ones that are combinatorial. As 
Ragin (1987: 27) observes: “rarely does an outcome of interest to social scientists 
have a single cause ... social causation [involves] different combinations of causal 
conditions [and] specific causes may have opposite effects depending on context”. As 
an illustration even a preliminary combinatorial analysis of industrial relations in 
Ireland would need to consider multiple and interacting endogenous and exogenous 
circumstances and changes including: the strong sectoral distribution of trade union 
membership – some highly unionised others scarcely so; the common educational 
background of many of the employees and managers; the dominant position of one 
trade union in the unionised sectors; the radical series of successive national pacts 
between government, employers, and trade unions; the rivalries between craft unions 
wholly based in Ireland and those with continuing affiliations to largely UK based 
trade unions; the „brain drain‟ and its later reversal; scale and type of foreign direct 
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investment, and so forth (Brown, 1981; D‟Art and Turner, 2005; Geary and Roche, 
2001; O‟Mahoney and Delanty, 2001; Sweeney, 2008).  
 
Social phenomena are complex not merely because they are almost always the 
outcome of multiple variables but also because those variables can combine in a 
variety of ways and at different times. The combinatorial, often complexly so, nature 
of social causation makes identification of causation highly challenging and far 
beyond the capability of unilevel analysis even when the latter is well executed.  
 
6. Test whether the case study is internally consistent: Hofstede‟s industrial relations 
case study is not internally consistent - a „masculine‟ national culture is said to 
generate/indicate “a feeling that conflicts should be resolved by a good fight” 
(Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 143). But then this is inconsistently supposed to affect 
only part of a national population viz. “labor”. In „masculine‟ countries “labor” is said 
to want a fight, but management in the same „masculine‟ countries is said to evade a 
fight. A „culture‟ that is said to influence a section only of a national population is not 
a „national‟ culture.  
 
Overall, what insights about industrial relations do Hofstede‟s case study and its 
claims about national culture provide? At best none even about national averages. 
Instead the case study misdirects. Misleading international business guidance 
provided is of the type: if you invest in „masculine‟ countries your business will be 
characterised by frequent industrial disputes and when a dispute actually occurs the 
predominant reason is national culture which cannot be changed. However, if you 
invest in a „feminine‟ country industrial relations in your business will be 
characterised by consensus. As the data in Tables 1,2,3,4, and Figures 1 and 2 clearly 
show, that guidance bears no relation with the historical reality. 
 
The analysis in this paper of Hofstede‟s industrial relations case study does not of 
itself necessarily constitute a falsification of Hofstede‟s model of national culture. He 
also relies on other „supporting‟ evidence. But the severe divergence from actual data 
and the methodological flaws shown to characterise the construction of his case study 
should encourage caution about accepting his attempts to validate his theory with 
case-studies. 
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Table 1:  Comparison of predicted rankings on the basis of the MAS Index with actual 
rankings 
 Country ranking based on annual averages of working 
days not worked due to labour disputes, per 1,000 
employees in all industries and services 
 
Predicted Ranking   1996-2000 2001-2005  
1. M-Ireland  2 3  
2. M-Great Britain  4 4  
3. M-United States  3 5  
4. F-Denmark  1 1  
5. F-Netherlands  6 6  
6. F-Sweden  5 2  
 
Notes: M („Masculine‟ country); F („Feminine‟ country). 
 
Sources: [UK] Office of National Statistics (2007); Hofstede and Hofstede (2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Working days not worked due to labour disputes, per 1,000 employees in all 
industries and services 
 Annual Averages 
 
Actual Country Ranking 
for 1996-2005  1996-2000 2001-2005  
1. F-Denmark (4)  296 36  
2. M-Ireland (1)  91 30  
3. M-United States (3)  61 13  
4. M-Great Britain (2)  21 26  
5. F-Sweden  (6)  9 34  
6. F-Netherlands (5)  4 12  
 
Notes: The number in a bracket after each country‟s name indicates its comparative 
ranking in the MAS Index.  
M („Masculine‟ country); F („Feminine‟ country). 
 
Sources: Office of National Statistics (2007); Hofstede and Hofstede (2005). 
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Table 3:  Comparison of predicted ranking of sixteen countries on the basis of the 
MAS Index with actual comparative ranking 
 Actual Ranking based on annual averages (%) of 
working days not worked due to labour disputes, 
per 1,000 employees in all industries and services 
 
     Predicted ranking   1996-2000 2001-2005  
‘Masculine’ countries  
1. Japan  14/15/16 15/16  
2. Austria  14/15/16 4  
3. Italy  5 2  
4. Ireland  4 8  
5. Great Britain  9 10  
6. Germany  13 14  
7. United States  7 13  
8. Luxembourg  14/15/16 15/16  
     
‘Feminine’ countries  
9. France  6 6/7  
10. Spain  2 1  
11. Portugal  10 11  
12. Finland  8 3  
13. Denmark  1 5  
14. Netherlands  12 12  
15. Norway  3 9  
16. Sweden  11 6/7  
 
Sources: Office of National Statistics (2007); Hofstede and Hofstede (2005). 
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Table 4:  Working days not worked due to labour disputes, per 1,000 employees in all 
industries and services 
 Annual Averages 
 
Actual ranking based on 
annual averages in 1996-
2005  1996-2000 2001-2005  
1. F-Spain (10)  182 189  
2. F-Denmark (13)  296 36  
3. M-Italy (3)  76 120  
4. F-Norway (15)  134 29  
5. F-Finland (12)  56 91  
6. M-Ireland (4)  91 30  
7. F-France (9)  66 34  
8. M-Austria (2)  1 80  
9. M-United States (7)  61 13  
10. M-Great Britain (5)  21 26  
11. F-Sweden (16)  9 34  
12. F-Portugal (11)  20 15  
13. F-Netherlands (14)  4 12  
14. M-Germany (6)  2 4  
15. M-Luxemburg (8)  1 0  
16. M-Japan (1)  1 0  
 
Notes: The number in a bracket after each country‟s name is the predicted outcome on 
the basis of  the MAS Index.  
M („Masculine‟ country); F („Feminine‟ country). 
 
Sources: Office of National Statistics (2004; 2007) 
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Table 5:  Predicted ranking based on comparative position in the P-D Index compared 
with actual comparative ranking 
 Country ranking based on Annual Average (%) 
working days not worked due to labour disputes, 
per 1,000 employees in all industries and services 
 
          Predicted ranking   1996-2000 2001-2005  
1. France  6 6/7  
2. Portugal  10 11  
3. Spain  3 1  
4. Japan  14/15/16 15/16  
5. Italy  5 2  
6. Luxembourg  14/15/16 15/16  
7. United States  7 13  
8. Netherlands  12 12  
9. Germany  13 14  
10. Great Britain   9 10  
11. Finland  8 3  
12. Norway  2 9  
13. Sweden  11 6/7  
14. Ireland  4 8  
15. Denmark  1 5  
16. Austria  14/15/16 4  
 
Sources: Office of National Statistics (2004; 2007); Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
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Table 6:  Homicide rates per 100,000 of a population 
  
 
Actual ranking based on 
1990-1996 homicide data 
  1990-1996 1993-1996 
MAS 
ranking 
P-D 
ranking (annual averages) 
    
1.M-Columbia 12 7 84.18 83.50 
2.F-Russia 16 2 24.60 29.98 
3.F-Estonia 18 15 19.64 24.03 
4.M-Mexico 7 3 17.50 17.27 
5.M-Venezuela 5 4 14.60 15.30 
6.M-United States 13 16 9.65 9.30 
7.F-Costa Rica 21 18-20 5.18 5.55 
8.M-Hungary 3 14 3.70 3.70 
9.F-Finland 20 21 3.18 3.13 
10. F-Chile 19 8 3.00 2.75 
11. M-Slovakia 1 1 2.40 2.40 
12. M-Italy 6 13 2.35 1.70 
13. F-Slovenia 22 6 2.13 1.98 
     
14. F-Portugal 17 9 1.54 1.50 
15. F-South Korea 15 10 1.48 1.60 
16. M-China 9 5 1.37 1.13 
17. M-Austria 4 26 1.32 1.17 
18. F-Sweden 26 23 1.24 1.18 
19. F-Denmark 23 25 1.21 1.21 
20. F-Netherlands 24 17 1.17 1.20 
21. M-Germany 10-11 18-20 1.13 1.15 
22. F-Norway 25 22 1.10 0.93 
23. F-Spain 14 11 0.93 0.93 
24. M-Great Britain 10-11 18-20 0.83 1.00 
25. M-Ireland 8 24 0.66 0.65 
26. M-Japan 2 12 0.60 0.60 
 
Note: M („Masculine‟ country); F („Feminine‟ country). 
  
Sources: Miron (2001); Hofstede and Hofstede (2005)  
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Figure 1:  Predicted gender ranking category based on the MAS 
Index of the six countries compared with actual ranking (industrial 
disputes) 
 
 Upper Half Lower Half 
Predicted outcome MMM FFF 
   
Actual 1996-2000 FMM MFF 
Actual 2001-2005 FFM MFF 
   
 
Note: M: Masculine; F: Feminine. 
 
Sources: Office of National Statistics (2007, 2002) 
 
 
Figure 2:  Predicted gender ranking category based on the MAS Index of the 
sixteen countries compared with actual ranking (industrial disputes) 
 
 Upper Half Lower Half 
Predicted gender MMMMMMMM FFFFFFFF 
   
Actual 1996-2000 FFFMMFMF MFFFMMMM 
Actual 2001-2005 FMFMFFFM FMFFMMMM 
   
 
Note: M: Masculine; F: Feminine. 
 
Sources: Office of National Statistics (2007, 2002); Hofstede and Hofstede 
(2005) 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Predicted categorization based on the MAS Index compared categorization 
based on actual events (homicide rates per 100,000 of a population) 
 
 Upper Half Lower Half 
Predicted gender  MMMMMMMMMMMMM 
 
FFFFFFFFFFFFF 
 
Actual 1990-1996 MFFMMMFMFFMMF FFMMFFFMFFMMM 
 
 
Note: M: Masculine; F: Feminine. 
 
Sources: Miron (2001); Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
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1
 Hofstede national cultural research is one of the most cited in the Social Science 
Citation Index (Parboteeah, Hoegel and Cullen, 2008). It has become an almost 
emblematic citation in a number management disciplines. 
 
2
 A classic example is in Yule and Kendal (1950: 315-316) who observed that there 
was a very high correlation (a correlation coefficient of 0.998) between the number of 
wireless receiving licences taken out from 1924 and 1937 in the United Kingdom and 
the number of notified mental illnesses for the same period (in Lieberson, 1985: 9). 
 
3
 Even the weaker test, if positive, would arguably not indicate that Hofstede‟s MAS 
index can provide some useful information. As discussed later in the paper, to have 
such positive content the two compared groups (masculine and feminine countries) 
need be equivalent – but those in Hofstede‟s case study are not. 
 
4
 Whilst there is considerable similarity been the coverage and methodology for data 
gathering in Denmark and Ireland, the minimum criteria for inclusion of a dispute in 
Denmark is more conservative than in Ireland and thus on an identical comparative 
basis the comparative industrial disputes position of Denmark over Ireland would be 
even wider (Office of National Statistics, 2007). 
 
5
  In the period for which data is available for Hungary (2001-2005) the average days 
lost in „masculine‟ Hungary was lower than in any of Hofstede‟s six named countries, 
including the Sweden the most feminine country in the MAS index. 
 
6
 Power-Distance is defined as 'the extent to which the less powerful members of 
organizations and institutions within a country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 46). 
 
7
 The results are available upon request from the corresponding author. 
 
8
 The lack of an evidence-base also characterises a number of his other validating case 
studies. For instance, Hofstede states that: “[f]eminine countries believe in modest 
leaders” (2001: 388). Relying on anecdotes one could perhaps identify „feminine‟ 
countries with “modest leaders”, but there is no systematic relationship. Almost half 
of the countries (Hofstede, 2001) he deems to be „feminine‟ have been controlled – in 
some cases for very prolonged periods – by dictators or highly autocratic leaders. For 
instance the following nine Hofstede deemed „feminine‟ countries were controlled for 
lengthy periods by autocrats - Chile (Pinochet); Portugal (Salazar), Iran (Khomeini); 
Panama (Noriega); Romania (Ceausescu); Russia (Stalin), Serbia (Milosevic); Spain 
(Franco), Taiwan (Chiang Kai-shek). 
